ANASTASIIA SYCHOVA

NATO Collaborative Practices: Political and Legal Regulation

Abstract

This paper focuses on the dynamics of cooperative partnerships in the military and defence sector based on NATO's strategic documents against the background of the rethinking of the global and regional security architecture, increasing hybrid threats and the trend towards strategic autonomy of national subjects. The author proposes examples of cooperative partnerships that represent the transition from multilateralism and multilateral international structures to minilateralism or multi-minilateralism by concluding bilateral agreements in the chosen vector. Ukraine is considered as an alternative model of a regional security platform through coalitions and the signing of agreements in the security dimension.

ANASTASIIA SYCHOVA – PhD in political sciences, Karazin National University (Kharkiv), ORCID – 0000-0002-0273-8469, e-mail: fampopprof@ukr.net

1 | Introduction

In recent years, there has been a consensus in the academic community that the international order is gradually evolving into an "essence" with a diffuse distribution of power combined with a tightly integrated and interdependent global system. Barry Buzan characterized this situation as "decentred globalism."[1] The idea emerges that the new order is not based on multipolarity or global bipolarity, but on a system in which the main centres of power are concentrated in different parts of the world, dealing with internal and regional problems, and occasionally getting involved in resolving interregional crises if they pose a long-term threat to their national stability.

The inconsistency in the global leadership of some powerful players, the growing strategic competition for resources, and the strengthening of revanchist sentiments have negatively affected the stability within the multipolar world, increasing gaps in the structure of international organizations and slowing down the decision-making process along with institutional reforms. Instead, a group of participants with shared interests and values can bypass irrelevant frameworks and address issues of common concern by mini-lateral agreements.

The development of minilateral agreements in trade, security, finance, and climate change is related to the inability of traditional multilateral institutions to achieve global cooperation on the most pressing issues: maintaining security (UN), establishing trade relations (WTO), coordinating efforts during the COVID-19 (countries mostly decided to act alone or with preferred partners). Accordingly, the minilateral agreements spreading presented an alternative solution to multi-subject institutions' ineffectiveness.

Modern geopolitics' poly-subjectivity is characterized by "increasing dependence on flexible, often specially created groups of stakeholders,"[2] which adds bulkiness and chaos to classic multilateral platforms. This trend forces us to rethink the partnership concept not only from a pragmatic view but in terms of existing practices institutionalization, cooperation principles, and their further implementation. Against the background of

---

¹   Barry Buzan, „A World Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism" *International Relations*, No. 25 (2011): 1-23.

²   Stewart Patrick, „The new "new multilateralism:" Mini-lateral cooperation, but at what cost?" *Global Summitry*, No. 2 (2015): 120.

collaborative partnership in the military and defense industry, NATO's normative and legal framework for such a specialized defense platform is of considerable interest.

NATO's open-door policy is essential for a comprehensive approach to reshaping the security architecture in a landscape of strategic uncertainty. The actualization of shared security challenges and the desire to strengthen the potential for stability due to the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine forced NATO members to reconsider their approach to partnership. In 2023, 18 partners participated in 16 Alliance-led exercises, while 11 countries contributed more than 30 troops to the NATO command structure and the International Military Staff, along with their support for missions in Iraq and Kosovo, and financial contributions to trust funds. The 2022 Strategic Concept[3] emphasized the connection between national security and NATO's stability, while the Vilnius Summit Communiqué[4] confirmed NATO's desire for strategic expansion through the possible membership of Ukraine and Georgia.

The paper aims to conceptualize a new model of partnership, transnational and polymorphic by its nature, through 1) reflecting the dynamics of changes in NATO's approaches to the framework of collaboration; 2) highlighting the advantages and vulnerabilities of minilateralism from the standpoint of supporting global stability; 3) identifying optimal ways for the coexistence of multiple interactive mechanisms by informal and formal levels and their subsequent institutionalisation in competitive multilateralism; and 4) modelling an alternative cooperation platform based on the security agreements with Ukraine as the optimal one.

As an analytical tool, the author used 1) content analysis of NATO strategic documents to track the evolution of approaches to cooperation through the frequency and change of semantic codes; 2) dependence path concept for reproducing the cyclicality of some action algorithms; 3) a transnational approach from an intertemporal perspective to distinguish cross-spaces of joint interaction, and 4) the collaborative governance theory of Chris Ansell and Alison Gash as a basis for modelling the author's platform.

---

³ NATO Strategic Concept, 2022. https://www.nato.int/.
⁴ Vilnius Summit Communiqué, 2023. www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.html.

2 | Theoretical and methodological basis: multi-minilateralism as a new format of transnational cooperation

Collaborative structures have one of the scientific niches amid strategic multilateralism. According to some scientists,[5] the collaborative governance category refers to "an aggregate of institutional processes and structures involving participants across sectoral, hierarchical, and geographic boundaries to achieve common goals". Some studies[6] recognize that collaborative institutions can be integrated into broader governance systems along with the coexistence of several collaborative spaces. At the same time, their dynamics depend on the network participants' behavior (cooperation with politically influential players, interest coordination, or optimal time allocation), and structural elements (social capital, network connections, multi-level networks, etc.).

The collaborative principle is closely related to the minilateralism category as "a more targeted approach to solving a specific problem compared to multilateralism."[7] Erika Moret asserts that minilateralism is based on coalitions of stakeholders who "desire and can work together to solve issues that are difficult to coordinate efforts at the multilateral level."[8]

Richard Haas tried to classify the forms of minilateral cooperation according to the purpose, distinguishing the "functional multilateralism type,"[9] when the agreements reached by the minilateral group become the foundation for more inclusive arrangements. Jana Urbanovska[10] investigated the factors favoring minilateralism in the European defense sector

---

[5]   Ansell Chris, Alison Gash, „Collaborative governance in theory and practice" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, No.18 (2008): 545.

[6]   Ansell Chris, Alison Gash, „Collaborative Platforms as a Governance Strategy" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, No.1 (2017): 1-17.

[7]   Moises Naim, „Minilateralism" *Foreign Policy*, (2009).

[8]   Erika Moret, „Effective Minilateralism for the EU: What, When and How" *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, (2016): 2.

[9]   Richard Haas, „The Case for Messy Multilateralism" *Financial Times*, 2010. www.cfr.org/node/158936.

[10]   Jana Urbanovska, „Minilateral Cooperation in the EU's Post-Brexit Common Security and Defence Policy: Germany and the Visegrád Countries" *Europe-Asia Studies*, No.73 (2022): 402-425.

compared to bilateral or multilateral cooperation, while Niklas Helwig[11] explained the usage of the minilateral format mechanism by Germany to strengthen its leadership position within the framework of the EU Joint Foreign and Security Policy.

Some scientists[12] maintain the position that minipartnerships are characterized by the following features: 1) a small number of participants; 2) narrow specialization; 3) results and commitments are voluntary. In contrast, multilateralism is defined as "a formal effort by more than three states to institutionalize a set of rules and norms to support a shared vision of a regional or international order."[13] However, scholars note that focusing on the numerical dimension does not consider the qualitative aspect of the differentiation between minilateralism and multilateralism.

Minilateral agreements focus on attracting the "critical mass" of participants necessary for a specific goal, as opposed to the broad approach associated with multilateralism. For clarity: the WTO presents a multilateral framework for regulating international trade, while the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a free trade agreement between the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, acts as a minilateral analogue in trade policy.

A common feature of minilateral platforms is the absence of an official institutional structure such as a specialized secretariat. This tendency raises the issue of a minilateral institutional memory lack, which correlates with multilateral platforms. Dememorization of the structural level makes it much more difficult to track statements, minutes of meetings, allocated funds and achieved outcomes. However, the confidential nature of miniparty negotiations due to the absence of mandatory protocol procedures is considered an advantage, as it allows participants to discuss issues openly, freely, and flexibly.

Thus, minilateral platforms mostly appear as "coalitions of the willing" to solve a certain problem or interact with a specific geographical region, without seeking to implement some global governance norms. Nevertheless, the discussion of new security issues (access to critical technologies, cyber security, supply chain resilience) may lead to new standards development

---

[11] Niklas Helwig, „Germany's Turn from Reflexive to Strategic Multilateralism" *Political Science and Public Policy*, No. 2 (2023).
[12] Alles Delphine, Fournol Thibault, „Multilateralisms and minilateralisms in the Indo-Pacific" *Foundation*, No 9 (2023).
[13] Patrick, „The new "new multilateralism", 117.

among a select group of countries, indicating the formation of an alternative political vector in global politics. However, the fragmentation of such norms may weaken the global consensus toward a certain field in the long run. Therefore, the future influence of minilateral collaborative platforms will be based on their ability to facilitate interaction on international issues, without leveling global governance mechanisms.

For example, the Indo-Pacific region has become "a center of minilateral activity."[14] Apart from the Quad, several trilateral agreements such as India-France-Australia, Australia-Japan-India, Japan-US-India, and India-Italy-Japan have been established to strengthen the regional security architecture. The India-Africa Defense Dialogue, held every two years since 2020, has launched a joint security agenda by inviting experts from African countries to deepen India's understanding of regional priorities and disseminate relevant narratives within strategic communications.

Minilateral initiatives in the Indo-Pacific and Asian regions pursued specific geostrategic goals. Thus, Quad creation is seen as a tool to counter the political, economic, and military the PRC's power, growing exponentially thanks to the flagship One Belt One Road initiative. China and the Russian Federation, for their part, proposed to create new "dialogue platforms on regional security issues"[15] against the background of the USA's criticism of narrow circles of bloc confrontation. A regional conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific region is used for overcoming gaps in maritime security and institutional architecture, where sub-sector initiatives focus on transparency, situational awareness, and trust between players.

Minilateral agreements can increase the effectiveness of multilateral institutions due to the agreed joint positions, clear identification of obligations and value propositions for each of the platform's participants, as well as the implementation of measurable performance indicators. The multiplicity and variability of institutions more fully consider the imperatives of different groups, for example, strategic alliances between leading countries and vulnerable economies will guarantee equal discourse, without tilting for the interests of great powers. This tendency could give additional opportunities to optimize negotiations on multilateral platforms for achieving the broader goal of international cooperation and global governance.

---

[14] Tan Seng, "ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting". *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. 1st Edition.* No. 15 (2020): p. 24.

[15] Delphine, Thibault, „Multilateralisms and minilateralisms in the Indo-Pacific", 23.

3 | NATO's collaborative approaches: evolutionary path

Despite institutional and organizational shortcomings, partnership plays a significant role on the agenda of the North Atlantic Alliance. As for the Declaration of the 2012 Chicago NATO Summit[16] the partnership term appears no less than 31 times. However, it should be noted that the NATO partnership concept is at a reloading. In general, its partnership formats reflect the change in priorities of the organization during a specific period and key events in the field of security and international relations.

NATO's partnership programs have changed their coverage over the past two to three decades, particularly after the opening of the Alliance to new members and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The oldest program still in existence is the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)[17], positioned as the basis for all forms of cooperation between the Alliance and partner countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, along with the more recent Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. However, they were finalized as static institutions mainly due to the lack of a coherent action plan and attempts to unite countries with radically different political and ideological views. For example, Sweden was one of the main participants in the NATO operation in Libya in 2011, while the dictatorial president of Belarus O. Lukashenko called this mission "vandalism"[18]. Due to the incompatibility of the players' visions, the EAPC and the PfP increasingly turned into a forum without drivers, while its members formed bilateral relations with NATO according to their own needs.

---

16   Chicago Summit Declaration, 2012. www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en.

17   Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council launches Phase II of Building Integrity Initiative, 2010. www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/news_63991.htm?selectedLocale=en.

18   Lukashenko considers the NATO operation in Libya an act of vandalism of the 21st century, *Belta News*, 2011.

4 | Mediterranean Dialogue

The transformational impulse that NATO has guided in Euro-Atlantic security creation since 1990 began to weaken due to the Russian Federation's war in Georgia (2008), marking the transition to a new type of partnership. Thus, the countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue[19] (MD) – Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia – received NATO support primarily for cooperation in security vectors and the removal of cognitive warnings about NATO. The political inspiration for the MD format was the so-called 1993 Oslo Agreements[20] on autonomy between Israel and Palestine, supplemented by the multilateral component of the Madrid Middle East Peace Process. The latter focused on regional cross-border aspects, such as environmental issues, economic development, and security. Last but not least, these negotiations were supposed to serve as a measure to strengthen trust and contribute to the normalizing relations between the states of the Middle East. However, from the position of contribution to NATO operations, the Dialogue was of secondary importance, barely rising above the status of a diplomatic conversation. For example, Jordan[21] was the only partner country participating in the ISAF mission (International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan).

The MD's limited effectiveness is explained by the following factors. First, the forum is made up of a quite diverse group of North African and Middle Eastern states that hold different visions on security policy and the extent of NATO's involvement in the Mediterranean. Thus, Tunisia is interested in reforming the defense sector; Jordan wants to cooperate with NATO in the context of advancing the Islamic State; Israel is concerned about exchanges with NATO on missile defense.

Second, due to the breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, the MD partnership implementation has become more complex. After the Israeli raid against the so-called "Gaza Freedom Flotilla" in the spring of 2010, one of the NATO members strongly opposed the partnership with Israel within the MD. The Dialogue was paralyzed by the Israeli issue,[22] a problem where NATO plays a quite modest role.

---

[19]   Mediterrian Dialogue, 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52927.htm.

[20]   Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), 1993. peacemaker.un.org/israelopt-osloII95.

[21]   NATO and Afghanistan, 2022. www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.html.

[22]   Sonia Krimi, „NATO and the Mediterranean Security Agenda" *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*, (2021).

Third, some partners within the Dialogue, especially from the Middle East, emphasized the limited MD's geographical reach and the difficulty of solving critical regional security problems without involving other stakeholders, including Libya, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon. The need to involve the Sahel region, West Africa, and the Horn of Africa is obvious. Initiatives such as the G-5 Sahel and institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and the League of Arab States could be engaged in political dialogue on an informal basis to further institutionalize NATO's ties in the region. Against this background, the proposal to divide the MD into two regional subgroups was repeatedly considered: the first one – for the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia) and the second – for the Mashriq (Egypt, Israel, and Jordan).

Finally, the vast majority of players advocated a two-pronged approach to enhancing cooperation. Partner countries have signed Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) agreements with NATO, embracing more than 30 agreed areas for potential collaboration. The menu of available activities has grown from 600 in 2011 to around 1,000 in 2018. Security sector reform consultations, joint training, and moving towards interoperability with NATO standards remain crucial aspects. However, the MD hub's practical value remains at the level of prospects.

It is noteworthy that after the Warsaw Summit in February 2017, a new Center for Strategic Direction South (NSD-S) was created at the base of the NATO Combined Forces Command in Naples. The NSD-S Hub's mission was to "increase understanding of the challenges in the Mediterranean and surrounding areas"[23] to contribute to NATO's situational awareness of the region, from the Persian Gulf to Africa. The precise contours of the NSD-S Hub's geographic mandate, as well as its level of funding, remain uncertain. Although it can serve as a focal point for the Mediterranean Dialogue partners and an asset in terms of pre-emptive warning of new risks along the North-South lines. It is worth noting that back in 2008, EU members created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED),[24] a platform that theoretically should also complement the MD, but competes with it, undermining the international security focus in this region. Currently, the establishment of relations with the Dialogue countries remains unresolved.

---

23 Ian Lesser, „The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue" *The German Marshall Fund* (2018): 38.

24 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED). home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossary/glossary/euro-mediterranean-partnership-euromed_en.

5 | Istanbul Initiative

At the 2004 NATO summit, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was added to the mix of partnerships for building relations between NATO and Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE. This format assumed that challenges to international security in the Persian Gulf[25] may have indirect consequences for the security of NATO states, so they should be solved together with ICI partner countries. As the MD, the the ICI partners also could choose between bilateral and multilateral cooperation. However, the initiative never developed into a viable regional security forum, partly because of the non-participation of Saudi Arabia and Oman, which, according to SIPRI, account for more than half of the total defence spending of the states in the region.[26]

Other countries of the Persian Gulf adhere, above all, to national security interests. Some ICI partners have even made it clear that they are less interested in good relations with NATO as an institution than with individual members of the Alliance, mainly the USA, the UK, and France.[27] This situation reflects, firstly, the regional order nature, formed both by the power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, along with the general desire to resort to military force usage, demonstrating the predominance of bilateral security policy in the region over the collective defense concept. This tendency was proved by the large number of individual security agreements concluded between regional states and external players.[28]

A priori, the chronic lack of a vision of the ICI's future as a partnership among NATO members, as well as the absence of the most influential state in the Persian Gulf region in its rank, explains the "modest" results of this cooperation after its launching. In addition, NATO divided the MENA regional security complex into two clusters – MD consisted mainly of North African states, and ICI – the countries of the Persian Gulf, ruled by the assurance about the similarity of security problems. This fallacy has left open the question of whether bilateral agreements between the

---

[25]   Jean-Loup Samaan, „NATO in the Gulf: Partnership without a Cause?" *NATO Defense College Research Paper*. No. 83 (2012): 8.

[26]   SIPRI Databases: https://www.sipri.org/databases.

[27]   Bilal Y. Saab, „Friends with Benefits. What the UAE Really Wants from NATO" *Foreign Affairs Snapshot*, (2014).

[28]   Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, „NATO in the 'New' MENA Region. Competing Priorities amidst Diverging Interests and Financial Austerity" *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs – Security in Practice*, No. 1 (2013): 20.

Alliance and various nations outside of current partnership programs would be a better approach. The mentioned alternative was confirmed by the formation of bilateral military and intelligence ties between the key players in the Middle East and the USA, the UK, and France. For example, the first three countries that introduced Individual Cooperation Programs (ICP) with NATO – Egypt, Israel, and Jordan – have the closest ties with the US and receive significant military aid.

In this situation, individual NATO members, paradoxically, appear as the main competitors of the Alliance in their efforts to deepen cooperation with the states of the MENA region. The regional interests of some NATO countries certainly outweigh the tasks of the MD and ICI partnership during the strategy development. Therefore, it is not surprising that the partnership is chronically weak in providing personnel and material resources.

NATO is considering an institutionalized partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), although an actual agreement remains a distant prospect.[29] The Alliance's growing interest in greater cooperation with the southern flank is based on the GCC's declared intention[30] to become an independent collective defense organization with integrated military capabilities. Despite the interoperability and treaties of the four GCC members with NATO, the scenario of creating a kind of "Arab NATO"[31] with its own structure and security priorities may also be on the agenda. In 2023, the security of the submarine cable network, which transmits about 95% of the world's Internet data and financial transactions worth about 10 trillion euros every day[32] was considered a cornerstone of collaboration between NATO and the Persian Gulf as a significant part of the global security architecture.

Therefore, in these forums, NATO's cooperation with partner countries is more focused on their resources for ensuring regional security than on familiarization with the Alliance's procedures or their integration into the Euro-Atlantic agenda. Accordingly, NATO's expectations regarding the democratization promotion towards the countries of North Africa

---

29   Chivvis Christopher S., „NATO's Southern Exposure. The Real Threats to Europe – and the Alliance" *Foreign Affairs Snapshot* (2016).
30   Sally Khalifa Isaac, „NATO and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Security: Prospects for Burden Sharing" *NATO Defense College Forum Paper*, (2011).
31   Vivien Exartier, „The future of GCC defense with NATO or as Arab NATO?", (2019).
32   Arnold Koka, „The Gulf Submarine Network amid sabotage and mine warfare threats", (2022).

and the Middle East through the defense sector reform remain unfulfilled. Alliance partnerships have played no role in efforts to (military) deter the Syrian civil war, fight the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, or build an effective Iraqi security force.[33] In essence, NATO missions concerning the Mediterranean are preventive and more like a manifestation of political solidarity than military stabilization.

6 | Searching for a transformative impulse

The ISAF mission radically changed a NATO strategic goal in terms of establishing long-term relations with non-member states that have significant military potential and are ready to deploy it within the framework of the Alliance's operations. The Alliance began to transform into some kind of "operational platform," open to partner countries depending on the type of operation, the region, and the military requirements. One example was Operation Unified Protector, a mission in Libya, in 2011, with the shared participation of partner countries (Jordan, Qatar, UAE, and Sweden) and 14 NATO members. In the long term, this trend may turn NATO into an "Alliance à la carte".[34]

The new partnership policy, approved in Berlin in 2011, aimed to move the Alliance beyond geographically determined structures such as EAPC, MD, and ICI, and to refocus cooperation mainly to a bilateral fundament, or through the "28+n" format. The idea was to allow all partners to participate in various flexible formats based on common interests, including on issues such as cyber threats, terrorism, or energy security. To this end, NATO has created a single list of partner events (ranging from seminars and conferences to military exercises and specialised programmes) so that partners can choose the insights they want, regardless of the structure to which they belong.

---

[33] Florence Gaub, „Against all Odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA Region" *United States Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute*, August 2012.

[34] Jakub M. Godzimirski, Nina Græger, Kristin M. Haugevik, „Towards a NATO à la Carte? Assessing the Alliance's Adaptation to New Tasks and Changing Relationships" *NUPI-Report*, (2011).

However, the Berlin reform worked only partially, mainly because of unresolved political issues that affected the practical aspects of the partnership. In particular, the dispute between NATO members over Israel brought the partnership to a halt in 2012, blocking the activities related to the NATO Response Force (NRF) deployment.

Karl-Heinz Kamp and Heidi Reisinger from the NATO Defense College criticized the Berlin Agreement for not distinguishing between those partners who share liberal democratic values and support the Alliance's missions and those who do not fall into either category. According to them, "Despite NATO's attempts to avoid favoritism, everyone knows that there are partners and partners."[35] According to the researchers, it is the active supporters of NATO standards who should be given "privileged partnership status,"[36] as they invest more effort and resources compared to others. NATO's failure to prioritize its partners turned out to be a much more serious problem that needed to be resolved.

Against the background of prolonged instability on the eastern and south-eastern flanks, the 2014 NATO Wales Summit[37] announced new forms of cooperation, aiming to improve and expand the military capabilities of non-NATO states. This "return" to the collective defense path was triggered by two factors, namely: Putin's revisionist policy, with the annexation of Crimea and the partly occupation of Ukrainian eastern regions in 2014, and the Islamic State's (IS) military success in Iraq and Syria.

Although the IS did not directly threaten either the territorial integrity or the political sovereignty of NATO members, the region's instability could negatively influence the Alliance's position. For example, clashes between Syrian and Turkish forces in 2012 led to the NATO Operation Active Fence to protect Turkey from attacks from the territory of a neighboring country. In addition, Russian military aircraft repeatedly violated Turkey's airspace, which resulted in the downing of a Russian Su-24 bomber by Turkish air defense.[38]

---

[35] Karl-Heinz Kamp, Heidi Reisinger, „NATO's Partnerships after 2014: Go West!" *NATO Defense College*, No.92 (2013): 9.

[36] Ibidem.

[37] Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan. Issued by Heads of State and Government of Allies and their International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Troop Contributing Partners, (2014). http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm?selectedLocale=en

[38] Etienne Henry, „The Sukhoi Su-24 Incident between Russia and Turkey" *Russian Law Journal*, No. 4 (2016): 9.

The new forms of partnership proposed by the Wales Summit partly revise traditional policies or partly duplicate their functions, namely:

a. The Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) aimed to preserve and further strengthen the ability of external partners to conduct joint military operations with NATO armed forces. On the one hand, this format extended the Combined Forces Initiative (CFI) of 2012, on the other hand, it combined activities planned within the PATG framework.[39] The meeting in Wales created an interoperability platform with 24 partner countries from various existing partnership formats. In the context of PII, five countries (Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden) were offered the Enhanced Capability Program (EOP) because their armed forces were considered compatible with NATO standards. Options for cooperation forms were not prescribed, but for example, the NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP[40]) contained a wide range of measures and initiatives in 13 areas to strengthen the country's defense capabilities.

b. The Defense and Related Security Capacity Building (DCB) initiative was aimed at supporting, advising, and assisting the armed forces of other countries. DCB was represented as a long-term commitment to create stability among NATO's neighbours and beyond it, without having to redeploy its combat units. Georgia, Jordan, and Moldova became the first partner countries. Functionally, this program resembled the equivalent of EU efforts to guarantee regional security by supporting key states and relevant regional structures. Thus, NATO is gradually shifting its emphasis from "security provider" to "security consultant".[41]

The cornerstone of NATO's collective defense initiative was the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) focused on Central and Eastern Europe to improve military infrastructure and identify bases for increased troop rotation and military exercises. The creation of the Joint High Readiness Task Force (VJTF)

---

39 Markus Kaim, Hanns W. Maull, Kirsten Westphal, „The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: Three Principles for a New Beginning" *SWP Comments,* No. 18 (2015): 8.

40 Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), 2021. www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/news_188399.htm?selectedLocale=en.

41 Markus Kaim, „Reforming NATO's Partnerships" *SWP Research Paper,* (2017): 23.

as part of the NRF (NATO Response Force),[42] was initiated, numbering from 4,000 to 6,000 servicemen, with the possibility of deployment within 2-5 days. However, the exact shape of the VJTF remained uncertain, as did the Alliance's security strategy in Europe.

Within the summit framework, the approved NATO Framework Nations Concept[43] opened opportunities for groups of states to work together on some cross-border issues. Participants were categorized according to the following scheme:

- The countries with material and technical bases for providing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection as well as fire support from land, air, and sea. Germany headed this group as a leading state.
- The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), specializing in conducting the operations, consists of Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Norway. The UK was the driver of this group. In addition, Denmark led a project involving the Czech Republic, Greece, Norway, Portugal, and Spain on multinational approaches concerning high-precision air-to-ground munitions.[44]
- The third group, for which Italy played the role of the base state, will improve the capacity to stabilize the situation, command, and control mechanisms.

Although the Framework Nations Concept is an important decision on the part of the Alliance, it once again emphasizes that the armed force structure of numerous large and medium-sized allies in Europe, such as the UK and the Netherlands, have been reduced to such an extent they cannot independently deploy a military unit in high-risk areas. Moreover, this initiative may exacerbate the problem of equitable risk-sharing among allies. Therefore, the Framework Concept should be reinforced with criteria for assessing the military burden distribution, for example, based on the percentage of defense costs, R&D, contribution to NATO missions, the frequency of force usage, etc. In the Summit Declaration, the Allies pledged

---

42 Wales Summit Declaration (2014). www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.html.

43 NATO Framework Nations Concept, 2017. https://css.ethz.ch/.

44 Richard Tomkins, „NATO Members Launch Air-to-Ground Precision-guided Weapons Initiative" *United Press International*, 5 September (2014).

to achieve availability targets of 50% of each member's total land force to be available for deployment and 10% of each member's total land force for permanent operations. However, the Alliance members were unable to agree on specific proportions in matters of their application.

At the 2016 Warsaw Summit,[45] Alliance members emphasized their desire to contribute to the international community's efforts concerning stabilization and strengthening security outside NATO territory. The Allies announced the deployment of multinational combat battalions numbering about 800-1,200 servicemen in Poland and the Baltic states. However, the announced deployment is not the same as the permanent one about what the states called for at the previous summit.

One of the points that deserves attention and was emphasized by Christopher Chivvis and Stephen Flanagan[46] is Germany's position. If in 2014 the country maintained a mostly positive attitude towards the Russian Federation, trying to avoid any provocations, at the Warsaw Summit, Berlin found itself among the leaders of the confrontation. Thus, as for Germany's updated National Security Strategy, the Russian Federation was defined "as one of the threats"[47] on a par with terrorism, the migration crisis, and right-wing extremism.

The Warsaw Summit once again demonstrated the lack of political unity among the allies on several key issues. For example, some countries (France) firmly supported the belief that the EU should give a decisive response to the problems of terrorism and migration from the Middle East, without delegating the relevant powers to NATO. Although it was European allies – mainly France[48] and the UK – that carried out airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, others, including Germany, declared "fatigue with direct military involvement in the region."[49]

The Warsaw Summit was also used to expand NATO-EU cooperation in areas such as countering hybrid threats and strengthening cyber defense

---

45   Warsaw Summit Communique (2016). https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.html.

46   Chivvis Christopher S., Stephen J. Flanagan, „NATO's Russia problem: The Alliance's though a road ahead post" *Warsaw Summit. National Interest* (2016): 12.

47   Integrated Security for Germany. National Security Strategy 2023. www.nationalesicherheitsstrategie.de/National-Security-Strategy-EN.pdf.

48   Jeff Lightfoot, „NATO Summit Special Series: France" *The Atlantic Council*, 24 June (2016).

49   Steven Erlanger, „Shifting Attention to Mediterranean, NATO Fights Internal Dissent" *New York Times*, 2016.

and maritime security. The European defense industry remained fragmented and divided along national lines.[50] Differences between Turkey (a member of NATO but not the EU) and Cyprus (a member of the EU but not NATO) were often considered as the main obstacle to mutual understanding. Some observers even suggested dividing the functions between the two structures: "hard" military tasks should be left to NATO, and "soft" peacekeeping and civilian-oriented missions should be given to the EU. However, the political uncertainty of the Allies made it difficult to achieve synergy at the EU/NATO level.

At the 2018 Brussels Summit[51] Allies committed to further strengthen NATO's role by helping partners, upon request, build stronger defense institutions, improve good governance, increase resilience, ensure their security, and contribute more effectively to the fight against terrorism. At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept of "security based on cooperation" as one of the three key pillars of activity by creating a global network of partnerships with countries and organizations. The new concept stated that there is no longer peace in the Euro-Atlantic region but a "constant risk of an attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Allies."[52] This thesis contrasted sharply with the 2010 assessment of a "low level of threat to NATO"[53] within the mentioned region. The concept also identified new security challenges (space, cyber, hybrid threats; climate change, etc.), but it lacked specifics on how to respond to these challenges.

The Madrid Summit marked the Russian Federation "as the most significant threat to the allies' security along with peace and stability within Europe," while NATO-2010 sought "a true strategic partnership with the Russian Federation." According to one of the experts, such a criticism "was the strongest against the Russian Federation since 1991 and resembled communication in the style of the Cold War."[54] The new concept emphasized

---

50   Paul Belkin, „NATO's Warsaw Summit: In Brief" *Defense Technical Information Center* (2016): 14.

51   Brussels Summit Declaration, 2018. www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.html.

52   Madrid Summit Declaration, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.html.

53   NATO Strategic Concept, 2010. www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

54   William Alberque, „The New NATO Strategic Concept and the end of arms control" *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, (2022).

the transition to deterrence and defense by building joint capabilities, namely:

- Deployment of facilities and military equipment on the Eastern flank. For example, France provided a missile defense system to Romania, while the US announced an agreement with Spain to increase the number of destroyers and deploy additional air defense in Germany and Italy.
- A new model of the NATO armed forces to improve the Alliance's readiness and response to threats.
- Broadening the network of global partnership: for the first time, the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea attended a NATO summit to deepen cooperation on issues of mutual interest, including cyber and hybrid threats, maritime security, counter-terrorism and the impact of change climate.
- Extending military and financial aid to Ukraine, increasing the level of interoperability of the Ukrainian armed forces with NATO standards.

ATO's 2002 Strategic Concept was therefore pessimistic about the prospects for arms control, proposing to focus on crisis prevention, which was to be expected in view of the leveling off of any negotiating process on the part of the Russian Federation. It is noteworthy that the document first mentions the PRC, "whose policy challenges the values and security" of the Alliance (paragraph 13). However, phrases like "NATO remains open for constructive interaction with the Russian Federation and the PRC" (paragraph 9) indicate the lack of a unified position of the allies and, accordingly, a political course regarding the mentioned subjects. In essence, the 2022 concept returned to Pierre Harmel's principle[55]: the first thing is deterrence and defense, then – control over weapons.

In July 2023, the Vilnius NATO Summit took place,[56] which some experts said became the "summit of Tomorrow's Day."[57] To adapt to a more com-

---

55   Pierre Harmel, „Future Tasks of the Alliance", (1967).
56   Vilnius Summit Communiqué, 2023. www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.html.
57   Jason Moyer, Henri Winberg, „NATO Vilnius Summit 2023: A Summit for Implementation" *Wilson Center*, (2023).

plex global security environment, the Alliance announced an institutional restructuring through the following steps:

- Agreement on new regional defense plans for NATO Allies on all flanks, including relaunching command and control mechanisms.
- Declaration on cooperation concerning cross-border airspace between the Baltic States.
- Development of a deterrence package against non-military hybrid threats (Maritime Center for the Security of Critical Underwater Infrastructure; a new concept of cyber defense and a laboratory "Virtual Support for Cyber Incidents"; NATO's Space Center of Excellence in France; energy infrastructure protection).

The Asia-Pacific Four (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) involvement at the summit demonstrated the inseparability of the European and Indo-Pacific security theaters. Sweden and Finland received significant opportunities to optimize operational planning and information exchange in the Baltic-Scandinavian region and strengthen NATO's influence in the Arctic.

However, the Summit's outcomes were ambiguous on several other issues. Thus, Ukraine was not offered a clear path and terms for joining the Alliance, although Ukraine is mentioned 48 times in the Vilnius Communiqué against 13 mentions in the Madrid Declaration. In response, the G7, consisting of the USA, the UK, Canada, Japan, Italy, France, and Germany, published a Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine,[58] which testified to their desire to hold the Russian Federation accountable, to increase the military and financial aid to Ukraine in the case of deepening Russian aggression.

The Declaration gives the basis for concluding bilateral multi-year defense packages with Ukraine. This document is not a guarantee of safety or an analog of Article 5 of the NATO Collective Agreement, which was clearly stated in the text. The Vilnius Summit showed support from the Alliance's non-member states, but to report on significant achievements in 2024, it would be worthwhile to focus on developing a clear shared vision of foreign policy priorities and future partners.

---

58   G7: Joint declaration of support for Ukraine, 2023. www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/07/12/g7-joint-declaration-of-support-for-ukraine/.

As mentioned above, NATO's partnership formats represent changing external security parameters and the Alliance's attempts to adapt to new circumstances. However, over time, the "new challenge – new format" principle led to partially isolated and partially duplicated structures. The fact that some countries are members of several partnership platforms or have special bilateral status except for NATO membership supports these findings. Just as changes in the parameters of international security have provided the impetus for new partnership formats, they have also led to the reform or termination of existing but functionally obsolete institutions. A typical example is the suspension of the activities of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership (EAP) with the Russian Federation after its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In addition, the division of responsibilities between various NATO units, ranging from Partnership (PASP), Operations (OPS), and Emerging Security Challenges (ESC) to NATO's Command Transformation (ACT), suggests a huge bureaucratic burden for effort coordination. With the increasing of partner countries, types of programs, and funding mechanisms, the system has become almost unmanageable. Such instruments as Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programs (IPCP), Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), Annual Programs (ANP), Planning and Analysis Process (PARP), and Defense Capability Building (DCB) have significant differences in the involvement level regarding countries-partners and monitoring procedures. The expansion of the partnership increasingly contrasts with the Alliance's original goals. Therefore, the structure of NATO's institutional partnership should adapt to the changing international security and the political environment.

The Berlin policy decisions have opened up the possibility for new forms of political dialogue with partners, including through more flexible formats on a case-by-case basis to enhance security collaboration over common concern issues. Currently, when choosing global partners, NATO is more inclined to the utility principle than to the geographical or value dimension. As Noetzel and Schreer noted, "before us is a pragmatic approach to the creation of NATO nodes in a new global security network, which is markedly different from previous attempts to perceive the Alliance as an exclusive club of like-minded global democracies".[59]

---

[59] Timo Noetzel, Benjamin Schreer, „More flexible, less coherent: NATO after Lisbon" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, No. 66 (2012): 27.

7 | Reloading the Partnership Vision: A Collaborative Platform Model based on Ukraine

Proposing a collaborative platform model in the defense and security sector as an alternative to existing international ones, the author assumes that in the coming years, partnerships with individual countries or groups of them will significantly increase due to national political changes and the reluctance of some member states to provide NATO/EU/The UN their resources for conducting military operations.

The trend towards a "bilateral" partnership format has become noticeable in the framework of NATO policy after the Berlin Summit in April 2011, as the political and material efforts the Alliance invests in partnerships are not always proportional to its gains. One of the new tendencies against the background of the growing interest divergence of interests and the reduction of defense budgets within NATO is groupings such as the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Nordic Group, the Visegrad Group, and the Franco-British Axis, to explore the possibilities of strengthening cooperation on security issues, as well as projects of smart defense as a complement to the existing agreements within the Alliance's framework.

This trend will keep going as countries are more willing to cooperate with states that share their interests and/or are willing to bear the cost of creating the necessary resources. Until recently, NATO supported such initiatives, considering them useful for "smart defense,"[60] but the question remains open whether these regional clusters will increase NATO effectiveness from the position of operational response.

According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, NATO currently has "two identities"[61]: the first is structured concerning Article 5 as a collective defense alliance, while the second is the center of a global security network, a collective security asset for global partners. This observation resonates with the words of former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski in 2009 that NATO "has the experience, institutions and means to eventually become the center of a worldwide network of diverse regional security

---

60   Anna Wieslander, „NATO Turns Its Gaze to the Baltic Region. Sweden Should Make Wise Use of NATO's Benevolent Attitude to Establish Closer Relations" *Euroactiv*, (2014).

61   Anne-Marie Slaughter, „Let Europe lead Ukraine" *Project Syndicate*, (2023).

cooperatives among states with the power to act."[62] However, the future trajectory of NATO's development is still debatable.

Struggling against Russian aggression, Ukraine also chose a minilateralism path, formed eleven coalitions of various defense issues, and signed bilateral security agreements with the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, Italy, and Canada. The agreements prescribe the future collaboration vectors in the military and defense industry (intelligence exchange, joint defense production, fight against organized crime, cyber cooperation, etc.), the financial support amount, obligations regarding Ukraine's restoration during the post-war period and reform, as well as the recognition of Ukrainian territorial integrity within the borders of 1991.

The security agreements confirm NATO's strategic goal of creating a sustainable regional security architecture by strengthening the partners' military capabilities and potential development. Although these treaties do not provide security guarantees but create a framework for receiving assistance and opportunities for further interaction. Thus, Ukraine can become one of the grounds of an alternative security path through a legalized hub of specialized support from partners who are guided by and respect democratic principles.

Although such diplomatic efforts some experts equated with the de facto Ukraine's integration into NATO, the security partnership could be strengthened due to the following aspects:

- The collective defense agreement does not guarantee the involvement of another country's military personnel in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine. A separate clause of the agreements stipulates, "in the case of a future armed attack by the Russian Federation, holding consultations within 24 hours to determine further steps,"[63] which does not necessarily mean providing military support. In essence, it comes about the mechanism for emergency operational response to aggression, the reaction to which will depend on the political will of the allies along with a political agenda within the country.
- Although the security treaties formalize the forms of military assistance, they do not specify the terms of its provision in the event of a repeated attack by the Russian Federation (e.g. within 48 hours),

---

62   Zbigniev Brzezinski, „If Georgia or Ukraine falter, Russia again becomes am empire" *Voice of America*, (2009).

63   Agreement on Security Cooperation between Ukraine and France (2024).

which leaves some room for strategic uncertainty among the armed forces.

- Detailing. Security agreements should be accompanied by a detailed partnership program with clearly defined action algorithms at the operational level (an attack) and in the long term (up to 10 years), for example, a Plan for defense procurement or joint defense industry.
- Forming a value proposition for each of the involved stakeholders. In particular, Ukraine can become a valuable security partner in the production of UAVs and electronic warfare equipment due to the strengthening of its capacities (at the beginning of 2024, the Ukrainian armed forces received more than 80 samples of their weapons); the planning and conduct of naval operations (a series of liquidations of Russian fleet facilities in the Black Sea region); the fight against Russian disinformation and propaganda; the protection of critical infrastructure, which is under constant threat of damage from Russian drones.
- Agreed standards and procedures with prescribed timelines to achieve interoperability with military and defence industry partners. A common regulatory framework with clear deadlines for its implementation will increase the effectiveness of joint activities with partners on tactical, operational and strategic objectives.
- Creating the partnership monitoring mechanism. Reporting serves as a tool for transparency and assessment of a specific country's primary tasks. Such reports may contain data on financial reporting, analysis of the funds' integrity, expert assessment and outcomes' verification by quantitative and qualitative indicators, audit of armed forces modernization, etc. A combination of different tools, adapted to the needs and specifics of the situation, can provide an understanding of how different components provided within a specific collaborative platform have influenced the both partnership's and national goals.
- Development of feedback mechanisms. Functional continuity makes it possible to evaluate the platform as a "hybrid" security institution, with a wide range of functions by varying intensity, not as a one-dimensional collective defense system. A security platform can only be successful if it solves the security problem for which it was created, or at least decreases it to a level where it no longer poses an acute threat to participating states. If this is not done, there is an

institutional embedding risk when specific cooperation formats are still available but no longer used.
- Prescription of the qualitative military superiority concept, involving the agreement of joint strategic deterrence of the Russian Federation between Ukraine and the pro-Ukrainian coalition partners.

Therefore, in the context of the regional and global security challenges, Ukraine can become a model of an alternative security platform capable of deterring Russian aggression against European countries based on developed partnerships and a shared understanding of threats. Such a place should provide a flexible, integrated joint force (as a prototype, the JEF initiative), able to act quickly at any time and in any location. The platform should have a security profile of potential activities – from military operations to humanitarian crisis management – with agreed operational models determining its place in the global security architecture, vector, scope of authority, and performance criteria. Despite the different nature of the "profile models", the platform's forces should be calculated to simultaneously engage in each of them or be able to integrate the provided resources to get a synergistic effect. Rethinking the military-defense vision of European security as an organic part of other planes (cultural, cognitive, political, etc.) as having common cross-points will help create a powerful integrated platform for joint actions to contain hybrid and military threats.

Conclusions

The difficulty of reaching a consensus through a multilateral forum rationalizes the parallel investment of some players in more "narrow" agreements on operational or ideological tasks. The flexible way of coordination and the limited number of participants make minilateralism more effective by specifying goal mechanisms that do not necessarily conflict with the ambitions of the multiformat. In a given context, they can even present "high-speed multi-subjectivity, which is not always synonymous with fragmented tasks."[64]

However, mini-stakeholder formats initiated independently of any institutional ties can be divisive. Their criticism mainly concerns changing the dynamics and priorities of the global security architecture due to the advocacy of national external interests, for example, Quad and AUKUS have their own autonomous political and strategic visions. Indonesian leaders

---

64 Delphine, Thibault, „Multilateralisms and minilateralisms in the Indo-Pacific", 17.

"reacted negatively to the AUKUS creation and Australia's plans to acquire nuclear submarines,"[65] expressing concern about the alliance's impact on potentially accelerating the arms race within the region. In the South Pacific, the AUKUS initiative to make the region a nuclear-weapon-free zone (Treaty of Rarotonga) was met suspiciously. In his statement, the Prime Minister of the Cook Islands called such an agreement a "destabilizing factor."[66]

It is worth noting that leadership, political will, and bilateral relations between subjects are the key factors of effectiveness within the framework of minilateral agreements. For example, in 1999, the Trilateral Cooperation and Control Group (TCOG) was established between the US, Japan, and South Korea in response to the intensification of North Korea's nuclear program. But the deal failed due to "historically strained ties between South Korea and Japan."[67] A change in political leadership can also affect a country' foreign policy priorities and willingness to participate in minilateral agreements. Thus, in 2004, the USA, India, Australia, and Japan discussed the Security Dialogue (Quad) for the first time to coordinate humanitarian efforts after the tsunami in the Indian Ocean. However the resignation of S. Abe as Prime Minister of Japan and the election of K. Rudd as the new Prime Minister of Australia in 2007 led to the failure of Quad 1.0.

The multiplication of interactive arenas, as well as their duplication of some diplomatic and strategic obligations, can cause the "weakening of deliberative spaces,"[68] resource dispersion, and agenda oversaturation, especially to initiatives whose functional significance is secondary about strategic objectives or competition between regional players. For example, the Indo-Pacific region's strengthening among the world's strategic priorities is accompanied by a surplus of proposals that require reinvestment. Thus, in the field of maritime security "significant progress has already been made at the ASEAN level,"[69] but it is repeatedly the subject

---

65   Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement on Australia's Nuclear-powered Submarines Program, *Communiqué* (2021).

66   Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration of Cook Islands. Prime Minister Mark Brown Meets with U.S. Counterparts in Washington D.C., *Communiqué* (April 2023).

67   Delphine, Thibault, „Multilateralisms and minilateralisms in the Indo-Pacific", 21.

68   Ibidem, 5.

69   Seng Tan, „ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting" *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. 1st Edition*, No. 15 (2020): 9.

of structured cooperation agreements at the multilateral level (including ADMM+, information fusion centers in Singapore, Gurgaon and IORA) or bilaterally (in particular with Japan, the US, the EU, the Netherlands and France). Proposals for cooperation in this sector, which put forward general goals without considering specific topics, are perceived as redundant, attracting only limited investments.

This logic was reflected in the concept of pluralateralism, defined by Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar as "the parallel pursuit of multiple priorities, some of which may be contradictory."[70] The neutrality principle, proclaimed in particular by India, demonstrates a pragmatic approach that favors the multiplication of tactical-operational partnerships combined with a clear rejection of binding alliances and acknowledging the potential contradictions. A tangential position is taken by Indonesia, which considers the rejection of alliances as a component of its international identity. In a situation of limited capabilities, such a position leads to a de facto weakening of the multilateral mechanisms on which the regional security architecture is based.

Accordingly, the articulation within multilateral and mini-lateral agreements in the geopolitical narrative requires a functional rationalization arising from agreed strategies. The agenda saturation and the overlapping of cooperation structures indirectly weaken regional multilateralism, reduced to a set of autonomous minilateralisms. These mechanisms attempt to respond to the perceived strategic urgency caused by the growing competition between "new" global players in key geopolitical gravity centers.

Nevertheless, the inflation of minilateral arrangements is likely to weaken the security architecture in the long run, destroying the space for deliberation, norm production, and legitimization. Rationalization of the identified trend involves avoiding additional shared platforms with unclear goals and reducing the oversaturation effect. But it is worth recognizing that minilateralism is the de facto collaborative norm at least concerning regional security. The problem of operational partnership vision implementation is to connect them with long-term multi-subject agreements by either giving preference to multi-speed formats (multilateral discussion of shared norms and goals, minilateral operational implementation) or participating in the dissemination and consolidation of norms that strengthen multilateral cooperation.

---

[70] Christophe Jaffrelot, „The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World' by Dr S. Jaishankar" *Atlantic Council*, (2021).

Bibliography

Alberque William, „The New NATO Strategic Concept and the end of arms control" *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, (2022). https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2022/06/the-new-nato-strategic-concept-and-the-end-of-arms-control.

Alles Delphine, Fournol Thibault, „Multilateralisms and minilateralisms in the Indo-Pacific" *Foundation*, No. 9 (2023). www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/recherches-et-documents/.

Ansell Chris, Alison Gash, „Collaborative governance in theory and practice" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, No. 18 (2008): 543-71.

Ansell Chris, Alison Gash, „Collaborative Platforms as a Governance Strategy" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, No. 1 (2017): 1-17. doi:10.1093/jopart/mux030.

Belkin Paul, „NATO's Warsaw Summit: In Brief" *Defense Technical Information Center* (2016): 16. apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1021858.

Bilal Y. Saab, „Friends with Benefits. What the UAE Really Wants from NATO" *Foreign Affairs Snapshot*, (2014). www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-08-14/friendsbenefits.

Brzezinski Zbigniev, „If Georgia or Ukraine falter, Russia again becomes am empire" *Voice of America* (2009). www.holosameryky.com/a/a-49-2009-10-13-voa10-86834367/220561.html.

Buzan Barry, „A World Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism" *International Relations*, No. 25 (2011): 1-23.

Chivvis Christopher S., „NATO's Southern Exposure. The Real Threats to Europe – and the Alliance" *Foreign Affairs Snapshot*, (2016). www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-04-17/nato-s-southern-exposure.

Chivvis Christopher S., Stephen J. Flanagan, „NATO's Russia problem: The Alliance's though a road ahead post" *Warsaw Summit. National Interest* (2016). nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/natos-russia-problem-the-alliances-tough-road-ahead-post-16952.

Erlanger Steven, „Shifting Attention to Mediterranean, NATO Fights Internal Dissent" *New York Times*, 16 June 2016. www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/world/europe/shifting-attention-to-mediterranean-nato-fights-internal-dissent.html.

Exartier Vivien, „The future of GCC defense with NATO or as Arab NATO?", (2019). https://ideas.repec.org/p/sek/iacpro/9812003.html.

Gaub Florence, „Against all Odds: Relations between NATO and the MENA Region” *Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute*, August (2012). www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/.

Godzimirski Jakub M., Nina Græger, Kristin M. Haugevik, „Towards a NATO à la Carte? Assessing the Alliance's Adaptation to New Tasks and Changing Relationships” *NUPI-Report*, (2011). hdl.handle.net/11250/277248.

Jaffrelot Christophe, „The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World' by Dr S. Jaishankar” *Atlantic Council*, (2021). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/.

Haas Richard, „The Case for Messy Multilateralism” *Financial Times*, 2010. www.cfr.org/node/158936.

Harmel Pierre, „Future Tasks of the Alliance”, (1967). www.nato.int/cps/en/nato-live/80983.htm.

Helwig Niklas, „Germany's Turn from Reflexive to Strategic Multilateralism” *Political Science and Public Policy*, No. 2 (2023). https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800887268.00018.

Henry Etienne, „The Sukhoi Su-24 Incident between Russia and Turkey” *Russian Law Journal*, No. 4 (2016): 8-25. doi:10.17589/2309-8678-2016-4-1-8-25.

Isaac Sally Khalifa, „NATO and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Security: Prospects for Burden Sharing” *NATO Defense College Forum Paper*, (2011). www.files.ethz.ch/isn/128708/fp_16.pdf.

Kaim Markus, „Reforming NATO's Partnerships” *SWP Research Paper*, (2017): 23. www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2017RP01_kim.pdf.

Kaim Markus, Hanns W. Maull, Kirsten Westphal, „The Pan-European Order at the Crossroads: Three Principles for a New Beginning” *SWP Comments*, No. 18 (2015): 8. www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/new-pan-european-order.

Kamp Karl-Heinz, Heidi Reisinger, „NATO's Partnerships after 2014: Go West!” *NATO Defense College, Rome*, No.92 (2013): 9. www.jstor.com/stable/resrep10403.

Koka Arnold, „The Gulf Submarine Network amid sabotage and mine warfare threats”, (2022). www.egic.info/gulf-submarine-network-amid-sabotage-mine-warfare.

Krimi Sonia, „NATO and the Mediterranean Security Agenda”, *NATO Parliamentary Assembly*, (2021). www.nato-pa.int/document/2021-nato-and-mediterranean-security-agenda-krimi-report-021-pcnp-21-e.

Lesser Ian, „The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue”, *The German Marshall Fund*, (2018): 38. www.gmfus.org/news/future-natos-mediterranean-dialogue.

Lightfoot Jeff, „NATO Summit Special Series: France” *The Atlantic Council*, 24 June 2016. www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-summit-special-series-france/.

Moret Erika, „Effective Minilateralism for the EU: What, When and How" *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, (2016). isnblog.ethz.ch/uncategorized/effective-minilateralism-for-the-eu-what-when-and-how.

Moyer Jason, Henri Winberg, „NATO Vilnius Summit 2023: A Summit for Implementation" *Wilson Center*, (2023). https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/nato-vilnius-summit-2023-summit-implementation.

Naim Moises, „Minilateralism" *Foreign Policy*, (2009). foreignpolicy. com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/.

Noetzel Timo, Schreer Benjamin, „More flexible, less coherent: NATO after Lisbon" *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, No. 66 (2012): 20-33. doi:10.1080/10357718.2011.637451.

Patrick Stewart, „The new 'new multilateralism': Mini- lateral cooperation, but at what cost?" *Global Summitry*, No. 2 (2015): 115–134. globalsummitryproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/New-Multilateralism.pdf.

Reichborn-Kjennerud Erik, „NATO in the 'New' MENA Region. Competing Priorities amidst Diverging Interests and Financial Austerity" *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs – Security in Practice*, No. 1 (2013): 20. https://nupi.brage.unit.no/.

Samaan Jean-Loup, „NATO in the Gulf: Partnership without a Cause?", *NATO Defense College Research Paper*, No. 83 (2012): 8. ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/nat/0031927/f_0031927_25923.pdf.

Slaughter Anne-Marie, „Let Europe lead Ukraine" *Project Syndicate*, (2023). www.project-syndicate.org/magazine/let-europe-lead-in-ukraine.

Tan Seng, „ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting" *Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific. 1st Edition*, No. 15 (2020): 24. https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/.

Tomkins Richard, „NATO Members Launch Air-to-Ground Precision-guided Weapons Initiative" *United Press International*, 5 September 2014.

Tirkey Aarshi, „Addressing the inefficacy of multilateralism – Are regional minilaterals the answer?" *Observer Research Foundation*, 2020. www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/addressing-inefficacy-multilateralism/.

Wieslander Anna, „NATO Turns Its Gaze to the Baltic Region. Sweden Should Make Wise Use of NATO's Benevolent Attitude to Establish Closer Relations" *Euroactiv*, (2014). www.euractiv.com/sections/security/nato-turns-its-gazebaltic-region-310962.

Urbanovska Jana, „Minilateral Cooperation in the EU's Post-Brexit Common Security and Defence Policy: Germany and the Visegrád Countries" *Europe-Asia Studies*, No. 73 (2022): 402-425. dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2022.2037520.