No. 4 (42)

The author considers the determination of the status of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in the legal order of the European Union. This Convention was concluded before the establishment of the European Communities, but its importance for the internal market is high. However, the Union is not bound by it directly, but only by some of its provisions through the TRIPS Agreement. However, its status may also not depend on the TRIPS Agreement, but on the direct links that the Union establishes with third countries through secondary legislation and international agreements. At the same time, all this means that the Paris Convention cannot, except in exceptional circumstances, be directly invoked before the courts of the Union and the Member States. Its role is greater when interpreting EU rules.

Protocol 16 to the European Convention of Human Rights introduced the procedure allowing national courts to request the European Court of Human Rights to issue advisory opinions on question of principle relating to
the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention or the Protocols. Since 2018,
the ECtHR has issued only five advisory opinions, the first of which was mostly criticized. Moreover, only seventeen
State-Parties have ratified the Protocol so far. Therefore, the author tries to assess first four years of the functioning
of the Protocol. He considers if the Protocol was really needed and is it functional? After presenting the solutions
adopted in Protocol 16, he briefly discusses the advisory opinions issued by the Tribunal so far. The Author observes
that despite the criticisms an overall assessment of the main idea of the Protocol is positive. It undoubtedly creates the first legal basis for dialogue between key judicial authorities in the State-Parties of the Convention and the Court of Strasbourg. Although the primary objective of this dialogue is to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of the Convention in the domestic legal systems, the institution of request for an advisory opinion by national courts will act as a constructive instrument in shaping European human rights standards. The introduction of a new mechanism can also be considered as another step toward making the Strasbourg Court the constitutional court determining the most important issues concerning the human rights standard at the European level.

The Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict has activated several initiatives to collect evidence of the international crimes committed during the conflict and to guarantee individual criminal responsibility of their perpetrators. Despite their extraordinary intensity, these processes do not make it possible to try the perpetrators of crimes of aggression.
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in this regard relates only to crimes committed by nationals of a State Party to the Statute in the territory of another
State Party. In contrast, the exercise of jurisdiction by the national courts of third states may suffer from several potential limitations. In this situation, Ukraine has launched a campaign to establish a special tribunal for crimes of aggression against Ukraine (STAU). The article outlines this initiative and the legal issues that would need to be resolved if it were to be implemented. Options for the establishment of the STAU are analyzed, taking into account
two main possibilities – establishment based on an interstate multilateral treaty and establishment in cooperation with an international organization (e.g. UN, EU, Council of Europe). The immunity of state representatives from foreign criminal jurisdiction and the applicable circumstances precluding wrongfulness is also discussed in this context.

This author aims to present the process of transformation of the Barbados monarchy into a republic and analyses it from the point of view of the standards of modern democratic constitutionalism. The abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of the republic took place in Barbados at a very fast, several-month pace, without public consultations or a referendum, contrary to earlier declarations about the importance of a referendum in decisions concerning the state and society. The abolition of the monarchy was achieved through fragmented constitutional amendments in a short time by a parliament dominated by one political party. While the change of the political system itself is consistent with the views of the majority of the citizens of the island, the way it was undertaken aroused criticism. Proper assessment of the events that have taken place requires looking at them in a broader political, historical and cultural context. The case of Barbados is significant in that it could become an inspiration for other Commonwealth countries that are considering changing from a monarchical to a republican-democratic system.

In the present study, the author argues that a necessary condition for the proper, thus professional, exercise of the judicial profession is the independence of a judge which is
conditioned by his or her moral autonomy. In other words, moral autonomy is conditio sine qua non of independence of a judge and thus is also a necessary condition for the professional exercise of the judicial profession. Therefore, the moral autonomy of a judge is a desirable and indispensable feature of a person exercising the judicial profession, as without having moral autonomy the independence of a judge is impossible at all, regardless of the number of systemic safeguards provided in the legal order. Such safeguards are certainly necessary, however, on the one hand, they do not per se ensure judicial independence and, on the other hand, they do not have the power to make that judge’s independence suddenly disappear due to any interference with them. In the context of judicial independence, the concept of moral autonomy has not been applied to date. The jurisprudence and literature on the subject indicate types, components, or guarantees of the judge’s independence, as well as the threats to it, however, there is no concept that encompasses the whole issue and that conditions the said independence. According to the author, the concept of moral autonomy is such a notion.

The article discusses Léon Duguit’s concept of property as a social function. The solidarist theory of law and the state of French jurist Léon Duguit can be divided into a theoretical (general) part, i.e. the theory of the legal rule and the concept of the state providing public services, and a practical (specific) part, i.e. the institution of property as a social function. Léon Duguit’s concepts were very much related to the great questions of the era in which they were created. This was especially true of the new view of property as a social function, which, according to Duguit, would respond to the needs of a dynamically changing in XIX century French society, for which the legal framework set by the French Revolution and the Civil Code of 1804
was no longer sufficient.

The authors address the issue of access to justice for people with special needs – primarily people with disabilities. Based on an analysis of the law and the empirical experience of one of the Authors in dealing with the common courts, the authors offer suggestions for change. According to them, a way to improve the access to the courts using information technology, including AI, would be adopting a human-centered vision of AI based on a system of human rights.

Entities are recognized as operators of essential services by way of an administrative decision issued by a competent authority for ensuring cybersecurity. An operator of essential services is an entity providing a given essential service that relies on information systems, whereas an incident, seen as an event that has or might have a negative impact on cybersecurity, would have a substantial adverse
effect on the provisions of an essential service by the said operator. An information system through which a given essential service is provided should be resilient to disruptions. If it serves the purpose of protecting services of strategic significance (including economic importance) to the state and society, it must be duly secured. Responsibilities in respect of security management within information systems are imposed on the operators of essential services.

The author characterizes the specificity of the evidence proceeding before the arbitration court, which manifests itself primarily in the distinctness of the evidence proceeding regulated in k.p.c. and the autonomy of the parties’ will to the arbitration in terms of shaping the rules of evidentiary proceeding. The author broadly discusses the issues of arbitration contracts and evidence contracts in the context of the principle of contract freedom and the issues of witness testimonies. The interpretation was made with Art. 1184 k.p.c. according to which: unless a provision of the Act provides otherwise, the parties may agree on the rules and manner of proceeding before the arbitration court. Suppose arbitration contracts in the broad sense (including the so-called evidence contracts) are substantive law institutions. In that case, it should be recognized that the only limitation in shaping the rules of evidence proceeding is Art. 353¹ k.c. and the imperative provisions of k.p.c. regulating proceedings before an arbitration court (Art. 1183-1193 k.p.c.). The freedom of parties and the arbitration court must respect the rules of procedure under Art. 1183 of k.p.c., i.e., the right of the parties to a fair trial, the right to be heard, the principle of equal treatment of the parties, guaranteeing the party the possibility to defend its rights.

In addition to the mainstream amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, a new institution was introduced – an objection to the orders of the assistant judge. In the case of one of them, a new appeal is provided for an objection to the order of an assistant judge for a summons to pay a fee. The author criticizes the introduction of the new means of appeal. His comments lead to the conclusion that the provision concerning the indicated institution should be repealed.

The admissibility of appealing against judgments of public administration bodies by courts in land and mortgage register proceedings is controversial in the views of the doctrine and jurisprudence. Dispute over the nature of the decision to transform the law. Does the court in civil proceedings have the right to appeal against a final decision issued by a public administration body or may the
court in civil proceedings may an application for entry of the ownership right in the land and mortgage register on the basis of the decision to transform the right of perpetual usufruct into the right of ownership? Another issue that the author of this publication considers in the article is the right of the public prosecutor’s office to eliminate from legal transactions a defective decision on the transformation
of the right of perpetual usufruct into the right of ownership of real estate. Can the public prosecutor
request the repeal of an administrative decision by a public administration body? Has the Act amending the act - Code of Administrative Procedure of August 11, 2021 (Journal of Laws of 2021, item 1491) changed the possibility of declaring a decision invalid pursuant to Art. 156 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure? At the very end of the publication, the author focuses on the procedure of reconciling the content of the land and mortgage register with the actual legal status.

The author presents the characteristics of the legal instruments available to the buyer of a flat or a single-family house if a developer defaults under the development agreement within the agreed period. He assesses their effectiveness, especially in the context of the current socioeconomic situation, and takes cautious de lege ferenda conclusions. The provisions of the Act of May 20, 2021 on the protection of the rights of the buyer of a flat or
single-family house and the Development Guarantee Fund, which entered into force on July 1, 2022, as an act intended to improve the protection of the buyer, are analysed in particular.

The fundamental value of family law is the best interest of the child, and all regulations in the sphere of relations between parents and children are subordinated to it. This requires the child’s parents’ cooperation in the exercise of parental responsibility, which should be exercised as required by the child’s best interests and social interests. Equated with parental responsibility, the duties, and rights of parents towards the child are the same, regardless of whether they are married or not, or live together or apart. In the event of a divorce or separation of parents remaining in an informal relationship, the court decides on the manner of exercising parental authority. One of the ways of exercising parental authority is alternate custody which enables parents to actively participate in their child’s life.
The condition for awarding alternate custody is, however, the best interests of the child and the maturity of parents included in the positive prognosis of harmonious cooperation. To elaborate on this issue, the following methods were used: dogmatic, appropriate for the analysis of legal provisions and judicial decisions, and a critica analysis of the literature on the subject in the range of the functioning institution of alternating custody.

The aim of the article is the problem of family dysfunction, implying the original issuance of orders by the Court aimed at validating the deficiencies noticed by parents in exercising the rights resulting from parental authority as a less painful measure. Then, an analysis of the premises for depriving parents of parental authority and applying the most severe measure in this respect, in this respect, in relation to the other parent, in a situation where, in fact, one parent is accused of neglecting the exercise of that authority. The author notes the mechanical application by the Courts of ordinances pursuant to Art. 109 of the Family and Guardianship Code Act, recognizing that they constitute a taxative catalog. The author notices archaism in the institution of the supporting family, as well as in the gradation of orders limiting parental authority to parents to place children in a foster family or institutional custody, even in the actual state of the case, where there are no grounds for depriving them of parental authority. The problem of the correlation of these provisions and the deprivation of parental authority in the event of its abuse by one of the parents living together is a legal gap that should be filled with axiological principles, bearing in mind the welfare of children, as well as the right to live in a biological family.

The author analyses one of the major dilemmas of corporate law, which relates to corporate mechanisms for controlling and safeguarding investment. Corporate law creates a systemic matrix, which facilitates the organizational management of the business entity and the activism of the investor. Separating ownership and control by the management of the JSC creates the presumptive
risk of unfair action. The managing person is more oriented toward increasing personal profit rather than maximizing the value of the company. Therefore, along with the general mechanisms of internal corporate management of the risk,
beyond the competence of the general meeting, it is necessary to equip shareholders with the corporate control mechanism having precise aim. Shareholder suit is one of the mechanisms of controlling and safeguarding the investment, which may be of the following types: direct (individual) suit, indirect (derivative) suit, and class action. A suit is a methodological tool used for initiating liability and restoring infringed rights of shareholders. Classes of the suit are the corporate strategy of investment, which is related to the control function of the shareholder.

The authors aim to determine whether de minimis aid and de minimis aid in agriculture is used by cooperatives in the agri-food sector – and if so, which one they benefit from; and whether the rules for granting the aid are beneficial for these entities. They also want to make a detailed assessment of de minimis aid granted in a selected industry, i.e., in dairy cooperatives, based on an analysis of data from the SUDOP database (Public Aid Data Sharing System). The de minimis aid formula is connected to membership in the European Union and constitutes a special category of support granted by the state. The authors open the paper by presenting general characteristics of de minimis aid and de minimis aid in agriculture. Then, they show detailed examples of aid established in various legal acts addressed to all entrepreneurs, including cooperatives. Then they focus on aid under de minimis formula dedicated only to farmers’ and social cooperatives. Finally, they present the issue of de minimis aid for dairy cooperatives in practice. In th summary, the authors state, inter alia, that cooperatives operating in the agri-food industry benefit from various types of de minimis aid and de minimis aid in agriculture. For some of them, especially the smaller ones, it is an additional and important source of financial support. The legislator increasingly considers the socio-economic importance of cooperative entities by introducing de minimis and de minimis aid in agriculture only for social cooperatives or farmers’ cooperatives. Such activities should be assessed positively, and they are in line with the European Union’s intention to create appropriate conditions for the promotion of the cooperative model, including financial support.

The author considers legal issues related to social assistance. It complements the social security system and occupies the lowest position in the system of measures aimed at satisfying the needs of people who are not able to meet their own needs. For this purpose, and bearing in mind the dignity of all people, benefit are awarded to those persons. Among these benefits, a one-off benefit can be distinguished. Granting such a benefit takes the form of an administrative decision or material-technical activity and is made by authorities. The amount of this benefit should consider the reported need.

The Act on Higher Education and Science of 2018 brought, inter alia, a change in the statutory conditions for obtaining the title of professor in the field of art. Premises for such obtaining have been significantly limited. However, with this change, the corresponding documentation requirements, currently established by the administrative
body (the Council of Scientific Excellence) conducting promotion proceedings, were not adopted. Also, the majority of reviews in these proceedings do not respect the new regulations, sticking to the old rules that are maintained in the aforementioned formal regulation. Administrative courts are also reluctant to force the above-mentioned Council to adjust its practice to the new legal status, and in particular to critically verify the review (including in terms of the reliable performance of contracts in question). Therefore, this situation requires correction, and first on the part of the Council itself, but of reviewers and courts as well. Its continuation significantly blocks new professorships of Polish artists. This study demonstrates such a need for correction.

The author outlines considerations on the criminal aspect of sports practices known as trash-talking. The conducted query of the literature leads to the conclusion that the above-mentioned issues are consistently omitted in research studies. The author first describes the background of the occurrence of the practices i question. He defines trash-talking. Then, the author presents its significant criminal potential, and the proposal of the concept of excluding criminal liability, updating indicated practices. In conclusion, attention was drawn to the contrast resulting
from entering the behavior burdened with a criminal charge under the trash-talkin practice and the imperfection of the previously indicated justifying solutions. Finally, the author opts for the circumstances excluding the criminal responsibility approach.

The nineteenth-century discussion on the need for and importance of codification and unification of civil law in Germany, as well as the law in the broad sense, assumed not only an ideological and theoretical dimension but also
a dogmatic and legal one because the presented concepts paved the way for the legal solutions adopted in the future. At the same time, the ongoing discourse has stood the test of time and influenced the views of many philosophers, legal theorists, and political and legal thinkers in the following years.

The author considers the codification of imperial constitutions (rescripts). After discussing the concept of codification in antiquity, she clarifies the etymology of the term codex, and presents the first attempts to formulate the Roman ius civile into one system. Then, the author discusses the concept and types of imperial constitutions, with particular emphasis on rescripts as responses by officials, corporations, and private persons to legal inquiries. She also presents a hypothesis on the idea of the origin of the rescripts from the practice of providing advice to clients by patrons. She uses the first two collections of
rescripts, i.e. the Gregorianus and Hermogenianus codes, to show the innovative nature of the Theodosian Code. The author ends with a presentation of works on the Justinian code and the layout of this collection.

The implementation of the unified civil law for the entire monarchy was to serve, on the one hand, the progressive centralization of the royal power, on the other hand, the
universality and certainty of the codified law were to effectively protect the interests and freedoms of subjects in private-law relations. The process of unifying the law in Austria was, therefore – as rightly emphasized – the result of two tendencies of that time: the paternalistic vision of a centralized Enlightenment monarchy and the legal-natural conception of the individual’s natural rights. For this reason, the process of codification of civil law in Austria
was essentially linear and evolutionary, not revolutionary. In the history of the creation of the Austrian civil code ABGB, there is a continuity of legal thought from the Teresian Code through the West Galician Code, which was the first complete, modern, and legal-natural codification of private law in Austria. ABGB was its perfect version in terms of structure and editorial.

The author deals with the history of the development of the family law part of the BGB and the contemporary criticism of the draft legislation, especially by the women’s rights
movement before 1900. Selected provisions from the draft legislation and the original version o the BGB are contrasted with the legal policy criticism published in the run-up to the enactment of the BGB regarding the discrimination of wives, illegitimate children, and their mothers. It is true that the demands of the women’s rights movement, which were very precise in legal terms, could
no longer influence the BGB legislative process before enacting the codification in 1900. However, a very late success of the women’s rights movement operating by the end of the 19th century wa that its demands to change the BGB family law were largely fulfilled a hundred years later up to the end of the 20th century.

This article is a continuation of the discussion by Christoph-Eric Mecke under the title “Was the BGB a Great Codification? – The Forgotten Rights of Women. Part I – History of the Origins of Family Law in the German Codification of Civil Law (BGB) Adopted in 1896 and Contemporary Controversies on the Codification of Family Law in Germany.” In this paper, the issue of the German Civil Code (BGB) codification is presented from a  comparative perspective. The author divides the text into two main parts; the first is a comparison of the position of a woman in the draft of the marriage law passed by the Polish Codification Commission in 1929 with the provisions of the German Civil Code from 1896. The second part
is a more practical look and concerns the comparison of the interpretation and application of the family law provisions in force by the Supreme Court in the former Prussian partition in Poland and by the Reichsgericht in Germany in the period between 1919 and 1939 in family cases decided that were based on the BGB provisions.

One of the most remarkable accomplishments of the Napoleonic era was the Code Civile - the Napoleonic Code. It was a crowning achievement of the ideological evolution
that followed the French Revolution in its outlook on the functioning of private law. The author presents the reception of the Code in the days of the Duchy of Warsaw. We can observe that, despite the first enthusiasm for French socio-legal solutions, the first critical assessments of those regulations appeared in the Duchy of Warsaw. The first rupture became apparent when the Code was introduced. Members of the Council of State, most
notably its chairman Stanislaw Malachowski and his successor Ludwik Gutakowski, spoke out against the expeditious implementation of French solutions by Justice Minister Feliks Lubienski. It is symptomatic that the political élite largely opposed the Code. However, the opposition was suppressed, and the Code was introduced, but Malachowski had to step down. An important opponent of the French solutions was the highest hierarchy of the
Catholic Church, headed by Archbishop Raczynski. For the clergy, it was unacceptable to introduce a divorce system and to make priests civil registrars providing services to Jews or non-believers, among others. However, the above voices were “quiet” and a major part of the élite was essentially enchanted with Napoleon.

The „Svod Zakonov of the Russian Empire” was the first comprehensive codification of law in the Russian Empire. It was developed in the years 1832-1835 by the Codification Commission, led by an outstanding Russian stateman Mikhail M. Speranski. The Svod Zakonov was a special codification based on assumptions different from those
adopted by the European legislation, aiming at creating separated, according to the material criterion, complete code sources of law applicable in each field. Its creators rejected the possibility of developing new codes and instead used the Bentham method leading to the creation of the so-called „Code de concordance”, that is, to issue a collection of legislation currently in force, coordinated internally according to the systematic order o individual fields of law and without any changes in its content. Consequently, the „Svod Zakonov of the Russian Empire” was a codification of the applicable legal provisions arranged according to the substantive criterion, covering almost all areas of law in separate volumes. Although it was systematically supplemented, and in subsequent reissues of its individual volumes their content was updated, such editions appeared sporadically and never fully reflected the current legal status in a given field.

In spite of the demands to improve some parts of the Statute of 1588, which arose in the second half of the 18th century, the Lithuanian nobility remained very attached to this codification. However, the surviving evidence proves that this law was repeatedly violated by the actions of the courts of nobility. This is confirmed not only by political writings, but also by diary accounts, sources of judicial practice, the acts of sejmiks, and even the letter of King Stanislaw August Poniatowski calling for the improvement of the judicial proceedings. Moreover, many of the shortcomings enumerated by the monarch are confirmed by other source accounts. This situation became the reason why the local nobility petitioned the Sejm for the said improvement. One of the most serious problems of the nobility’s justice system was the unlawful prolongation of proceedings.

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was one of a few countries in Renaissance Europe that created a codified law. In 1529, 1566, and 1588 it was brought by monarchs and estates. It was mainly due to the profound transformation of a social structure, fast political and economic changes, a necessity to reinforce the state, and strengthen the bounds between Poland and Lithuania in the face of Muscovite danger. Lithuanian and Ruthenian customary laws, hitherto privileges, norms of Polish, Roman, Magdeburg, Masovian, Ecclesiastical (both Catholic and Orthodox) laws, and practice experience were the sources of the codification.
The Third Statute, the most excellent of the statutes of Lithuania, consisted of 14 chapters that included 488 articles. The code attempted to cover the entire legal system (so-called political an judicial law), e.g., the political system, rights of estates, private and criminal laws, administration of justice and judicial procedure. Like previous Lithuanian codes, the Third Statute declared the territoriality of law principle. Humanitarian ideas influenced the code: emphasized in the in dubio pro reo principle limited the responsibility of juveniles, granted public defender for the poor, and eliminated most of the causes for enslaving. Despite numerous attempts, it was not revised. The Sejm constitutions, precedent judgments of the common courts, and the resolutions of the Permanent Council in the second half of the 18th century decided matters not regulated by the code. Still, applying the Statute in practice sometimes differed from its literal meaning. After the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russia gradually limited the scope of use of the Third Statute, and finally, it was annulled in 1840. Nonetheless, it had some practical importance after that date. Yet, by the end of the 19th century, some trials in succession cases wer based on its norms and some of its institutions were transferred into customs still in use in the third decade of the 20th century. The Third Statute also played an essential role as a symbol of the separateness
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, both during the times of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and in the 19th century.

The author describes selected legal views and scientific theses of Eugeniusz Waśkowski. The article proves that Waśkowski based his academic considerations in civil law
development on theories drawn from French, German, and Austrian studies. To explain the principle of the autonomy of the parties of a legal relationship, which was guaranteed by European codes, he refers to the views of French lawyers. He explains the limitations of this principle based on the opinions of German science (neighborhood law) and of Joseph Charmont (the phenomenon of ,,socialization of law”). His works also addressed the issue of compiling
civil law in Russia, showing the reasons for the declining codification trend in that country in the 19th century. In the views on the codification of civil procedure in Europe and Poland, an essential element was that Waśkowski drew attention to creating a basic catalog of procedural rules and a ,,system of procedural rights”, derived from the theory of subjective rights.

The author presents the Codification Commission of the Second Polish Republic, which symbolized the idea of preparing Poland’s own legislation. The author focuses on the ideological and doctrinal foundations of the codification of private law (civil and commercial) and criminal law in Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, representing a specific pattern, a manifestation of the pursuit of modernity, the progressiveness of codes of civil law,
commercial law, civil procedure, substantive criminal law, and criminal procedure. These codifications often reflected the opposing currents in the science of law, creating model approaches and serving as a certain legislative standard. On this basis, the author shows firstly, which models Polish codifiers took as a model. And secondly, whether and to what extent the legal acts prepared by them corresponded to development trends and brought original elements to the European codification of law. The author proves that considering the difficult political and social situation of Poland, and – above all – the necessity to build the entire
organizational structure of the state almost from basis, the economic situation, party struggles, and finally the deep particularism of the district legislatures, the achieved results should be assessed highly despite the failure to complete the process of unification and codification of the law.

The author focuses on the activity toward the codification of old-Polish law between the 15th and 17 centuries. The Author discussed the achievements of codification that gained the official status and were included among sources of statutory law. Unfortunately, their count is not impressive; one can identify only two of them: Łaski Statut and Formula Processus. Separately, other works on codifications, undertaken from an initiative of state authorities – the General Diet (Sejm Walny) or the king, were presented. Those attempts were prominent in the first half of the 16th century but failed ultimately. Many were transformed, sometimes even against their creators’ wishes, into private initiatives. Authors of individual
codification projects often hoped that the General Diet would eventually accept their proposals to become the cannon of statutory law. Those plans fell apart, and individual projects were not accepted as official legal sources but were popularised in private collections. Finally, the author shortly discusses the old-Polish research on the law created during the analyzed period. They were prepared as private collections of legal acts or attempts at proper old-Polish law descriptions. They represented various content, structure, and quality. The aim of their creation was mainly practical – to serve the daily works of the justice system. The other sources analyzed by the author were particular – local and fragmentary sources
of the law. Their enactments were caused by the failure of attempts to accept the complete codification of old-Polish civil and criminal law.

Criminal procedural law is a set of provisions regulating all issues related to the criminal process, particularly defining its model. Criminal procedural law provisions are the most constant and the most crucial element of the criminal trial model. They are generally defined during the development of a given regulation – with regard to criminal procedural law in the Second Polish Republic they were defined by its codification. Despite its shortcomings, the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928, due to its priority and presented values, is still a model law in historical and comparative research. It was based on the assumptions of the classical school in the study of criminal law. However, its authors also took into account some assumptions of the sociological school. Among contemporary penal procedure codifications, the Code mainly referred to the French Code of Criminal Procedure of 1808. It was the first Polish criminal procedure codification in which the achievements of the Enlightenment and later legal doctrines could be widely used. No wonder all reforms of the criminal procedure after 1945 were based on the Code of 1928. Therefore, among others, it was referred to during the work on the current Code of Criminal Procedure of 1997.

Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky (1772-1839) was a son of an underprivileged village priest who went on to become an advisor of tsar Alexander I of Russia. Following the tsar’s orders, he played a vital part in the process of transforming
the systemic structures of the Russian Empire, actively supervising the works of a commission that was set up to develop complex projects concerning criminal and civil law codification. During this process, he faced opposition from conservative environments that were reflected in Nikolay Karamzin’s Memoir on Ancient an Modern Russia (1811). He was dismissed in 1812 but would return to the tsar’s court
again under the rule of Nicholas I of Russia.

The author aims to respond to the position of the Supreme Court expressed in the judgment of 24 April 2018, V CNP 22/17, and thus to answer the question of whether “in
a situation where the flat area of the person entitled to maintenance exceeds what is necessary to satisfy the justified housing needs of one person, the expectation of its sale does not violate the rule that the entitled person cannot be required to dispose of the house or apartment which serves to meet his justified housing needs”? The analysis of the voted judgment leads to a positive answer to this question, and thus to the approval of the opinion of
the Supreme Court. The author presents arguments in favor of the accuracy of the thesis formulated by the Supreme Court.

The author considers the extremely important issue of verifying the validity of a drawn will. By adopting the voted decision, the Supreme Court was forced to make elections and set priorities in the mutual relations between the
formalism of inheritance law and the principle of freedom of testing, between the interpretation of a benevolent interpretation of a will (favor testamenti) and code sanctions for violating the formal rigors of a will. The title ruling has significant juridical and practical values. It considers the right to inherit in its constitutional and
axiological dimension.

The author analyses the ruling of the Court of Appeal on subsidized claims to compensate for the difference between the subsidy due and the subsidy transferred.
Legal scholars assume a different nature of these claims: from public law in the case of a subsidy claim to a civil law one when the subject is a claim for damages. The accepted nature of the claim affects the admissibility of it assignment. Assuming a civil law nature, in principle, the assignment is admissible. However, in the commented case, the Court of Appeal rightly concluded that the assignment
was inadmissible. However, this limitation results from the nature of the relationship, i.e.one of the limitations indicated in Art. 509 Civil Code.