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Articles

No. 34 (2020)

Post-Legislative Regulatory Impact Analysis in American Federal System

DOI
https://doi.org/10.36128/priw.vi34.141
Submitted
March 22, 2020
Published
2021-01-18

Abstract

In all legal systems, particular importance is attached to legislation. Nowadays, it is the domain of two authorities: legislative and executive power. This understanding of legislation conditioned by this assumption covers, therefore, both statutes, acts of the rank of the statutes and generally applicable acts of executive nature. It also allows analyzing an institution particularly interesting in the American system – Regulatory Impact Analysis. Such analysis is prepared in relation to executive acts issued by federal regulatory agencies. President Donald Trump decided to introduce in 2017 the „two out-one in” principle, which may significantly change the process of preparing such analysis. These issues are important due to the possible plans to reform Polish solutions in that manner. In the United States, there is also a procedure for checking the effectiveness of regulations conducted by the services subordinated to Congress. As far as its basis is concerned, this solution does not differ from those of the Polish Bureau of Research of the Chancellery of the Sejm.

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