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Articles

No. 4 (38) (2021)

Th e principle of Double Eff ect and the Problem of Abortion

  • Agata Czarnecka
Submitted
31 December 2021
Published
06-01-2022

Abstract

The author discusses the problem of abortion from the new natural law theory perspective. The new natural law theory is a contemporary Anglo-Saxon ethical theory and philosophy of law. Since it is considered to be a revival of the Thomistic natural law theory, the author presents the
NNTL approach toward the known from centuries principle of double effect. The new natural law theorists are against any kind of voluntary abortion but they recognize that there is a particular group of cases in which abortion is permissible.

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