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Articles

No. 3 (46) (2023)

Natural Law Theory and its Benefits: Arguments for Adopting New Classical Natural Law Theory Based on a Priority of Persons

Submitted
4 September 2023
Published
17-11-2023

Abstract

The author presents the system of law in light of contemporary theories of natural law shaped by Aquinas, Finnis, and Hervada’s thought on natural law. The natural law perspective adopted in the text assumes that the source of
both the normativity of law and the subsequent legitimacy of the processes of lawmaking and law application is man understood as a person (personalism), whereby his/her personal character is recognized and not arbitrarily conferred,
moreover, it is linked to the time of actual, biological life. The person is thus the source of the normativity of law both because of the individual aspect of the person and because of the general nature of human nature (above all the freedom and rationality of that nature). Recognition of the human as
a person implies the need to refer to his or her inherent dignity. The perspective of natural law as a framework for conducting legal research implies that the articulation of axiological assumptions should precede any reflection on
criminal, constitutional, civil, and labor law.

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