This article analyzes the first military doctrine of the Russian Federation (1993) through a rigorous political-legal framework. Rather than viewing the document as a military guideline, the research identifies it as a constitutive act of state-building that emerged from the severe constitutional crisis. The paper demonstrates that the doctrine served as a critical legal instrument for consolidating power within the executive branch. The doctrine effectively eliminated the conventional distinction between external defense and internal security, permitting the use of military force against domestic political adversaries. It also created the legal foundation to legitimize coercive peacekeeping in the Near Abroad and enabled Russia to execute operations while evading UN mandates. A strategic shift is apparent in nuclear strategy; the abandonment of the No First Use commitment has turned the nuclear arsenal into a formidable tool for global and regional coercion. Finally, the article argues that doctrine, validated by the 1995 Constitutional Court ruling, cemented a strategic culture rooted in the primacy of force and a claim to exclusive spheres of influence.